


**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**  
**Routing Slip**

| TO: |           | ACTION   | INFO      | DATE | INITIAL |
|-----|-----------|----------|-----------|------|---------|
| 1   | DCI       |          |           |      |         |
| 2   | DDCI      |          | ✓ (2 cys) |      |         |
| 3   | EXDIR     |          |           |      |         |
| 4   | D/ICS     |          |           |      |         |
| 5   | DDI       | ✓        |           |      |         |
| 6   | DDA       |          |           |      |         |
| 7   | DDO       |          |           |      |         |
| 8   | DDS&T     |          |           |      |         |
| 9   | Chm/NIC   | ✓        |           |      |         |
| 10  | GC        |          |           |      |         |
| 11  | IG        |          |           |      |         |
| 12  | Compt     |          |           |      |         |
| 13  | D/EEO     |          |           |      |         |
| 14  | D/Pers    |          |           |      |         |
| 15  | D/OEA     |          |           |      |         |
| 16  | C/PAD/OEA |          |           |      |         |
| 17  | SA/IA     |          |           |      |         |
| 18  | AO/DCI    |          |           |      |         |
| 19  | C/IPD/OIS |          |           |      |         |
| 20  |           |          |           |      |         |
| 21  |           |          |           |      |         |
| 22  |           |          |           |      |         |
|     |           | SUSPENSE | _____     |      |         |
|     |           |          | Date      |      |         |

Remarks:

  
**Executive Secretary**  
 12/29/82  
 Date



29 December 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence  
Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Reaching Out

1. Several papers of late, by their contrast to our normal analysis, have made me think that CIA has become very conservative in our intelligence analysis. Conservative not in the political sense, but conservative in our timidity to reach out and go beyond what the facts suggest. Indeed, one can argue that the strength of CIA lies in its ability to "tell the facts," and the reader can go beyond or in any direction the facts may lead.

2. When I took over the DDI a few years back I had somewhat of the same feeling and I urged the office directors to encourage the analysts to "dare to be wrong." I felt that the United States Government was not getting its money's worth out of the mental capacity that exists in this organization. That far too often our analysis had been constrained to the boundaries of our knowledge. That we were not really realizing all the power of our intellectual analysis to drive our thought processes to those contingencies which the facts at the present may not suggest.

3. I am heartened by NIC's recent effort by the NIOs to work on papers of possible contingencies in their various regions and functional disciplines. The DDI uses the outlet of a publication quite infrequently where an analyst may publish his thoughts which are heavily caveated with the phrases, "uncoordinated, personal views, etc., etc." I think we might consider encouraging more such papers but before I get too excited about this I would like to have your own views, preferably orally, where we can discuss the composition of our intelligence production and whether we ought to leave well enough alone or indeed stimulate our analysts to newer and broader horizons.

  
John N. McMahon